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The Second Anglo-Boer War and India 
Shigeru AKITA 
In recent years, there have appeared some excellent books and research about the 
turning of the era from the 19th to 20th century in the fields of British imperial history and 
British imperialism. For example, E.J.Hobsbown published The Age of EmPire 1875-1914 
(London, 1987) and completed his comprehensive historical works on "the long 
nineteenth-century." L.E.Davis and R.A.Huttenback published Mammon and the Pursuit 
of EmPire : The Ecorwmics of British Imperialism (Cambridge, 1986) and argued one very 
orthodox theme of British economic history, "Costs and Benefits of British Imperialism," 
by using cliometrics. Their provocative book has renewed our interest in this question 
and lead to controversy among some famous imperial historians.< 1 ) In addition to these, 
two excellent books written in Japanese have been published by joint-research groups : 
One, British Capitalism and the Imperialistic World (Fukuoka, 1990) written by a Tohoku 
University group, reveals the economic structure of the imperialistic world-system. The 
other, The World at the. Twn of the Centw·y : the Stratified Strw:ture of Imperial Rule (Tokyo, 
1989) is by D.Yui and Y.Kibata et al. 
Although I am much impressed with these new works, the purpose of this paper is to 
interrelate the Second Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902) and India from the following two 
points of view. 
(1) The Second Anglo-Boer War seemed to be a great watershed of British imperial 
history. The U.K. faced the problem of rising cost of defending the empire and was forced 
to transform the structure of the British Empire. S.B.Saul's Studies in British Overseas Trade 
1870-1914 (Liverpool, 1960) revealed the economic interrelation of the British Empire, 
that is, the system of multilateral trade and settlement. While I'll appreciate the results of 
those economic history analyses in this paper, first, I'll reveal the politico-military 
interrelationship and the changing structure of the British Empire during this critical era, 
centering around the largest formal empire, India. 
(2) At the turn of the century from the 19th to 20th, the capitalist modem world-system, 
what was called "Pax Britannica, " was left unsettled by the Second Anglo-Boer War. In 
that sense, this era seemed to be the first step towards the change of world-hegomony 
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from the U.K. to the U.S. A. . Of course, there has been some well-grounded research on 
this theme in the field of international politics. < 2 ) However, their main concern was only 
to build abstract models from British historical experiences. I'll go further, clarifying the 
British dilemma and their racism, attaching much importance to their attitude toward 
Native Indian troops. 
Native Indian troops were often dispatched overseas in the 19th century in order to 
expand and defend the British Empire in the East. In response to them, Indian nationalists 
severely criticized those imperial military activities, but I cannot find any official record of 
Native Indian troops having been dispatched to South Africa during the Boer War. Why 
were Native Indian troops not mobilized in large numbers during this critical British 
imperial war? Previous research only indicated the mutual relationship between India and 
South Africa.< 3) In addition research by Indian scholars was likely to concentrate on the 
political struggles between Viceroy Curzon and the Indian National Congress, and lacked 
any concern about the external relationship of British Empire. < 4 ) Therefore, I'll put 
much emphasis upon the mobilization of Native Indian troops as the connecting rod 
between India and South Africa. 
I have looked through and investigated the following documents --British 
Parliamentary Papers such as the Welby Commission's Final Report on Indian Expenditure 
(1990), the Royal Commission's Reports on War in South Africa (1903) and some 
influential British and Indian newspapers. 
The Report of the Welby Commission, 1900 
The problem of dispatching Native Indian troops outside India and payment for their 
services was often the most controversial theme between the India Office and the 
Government of India in the latter half of the 19th century. Resolutions on military 
problems were adopted at every annual meeting of the Indian National Congress. Under 
such circumstances, the Royal Commission on the Administration of Expenditure of India 
(Indian Expenditure Commission), headed by Lord Welby, was appointed by Royal 
Warrant on May 24,1895. The main aim of this Commission is to inquire into the 
Administration and Management of the Military and Civil Expenditure incurred under the 
authority of the Secretary of State for India in Council, or of the Government of India, 
and the apportionment of charges between the governments of the United Kingdom and of 
India for purposes in which both were interested. After 5 years of deliberation, the 
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Commission submitted its final report on April 6,1900. (5) The Second Anglo-Boer War 
had just broken out about six months before. 
The Final Report consists of the following three sections and a separate report : I . The 
Financial Machinery of the Government of India. II. The Progress of Expenditure during 
recent years. III. The apportionment of Expenditure between India and the United 
Kingdom. This report is a comprehensive survey about Indian Finance and is essential for 
the study of Anglo-Indian financial relationships; however, in this paper, I put much 
emphasis upon Section III which mainly concerns payment for the deployment of Native 
Indian troops outside India. 
In Section III of the Final Report, the Commission ascertained that the final authority 
for determining the relative interests of the United Kingdom and of India must reside in 
the Home Government and in Parliament. It covers the whole range of civil, army and 
naval budgets. Regarding the civil expenditures, part of the cost of maintaining the 
Legation and Consulates in Persia and China was borne by Indian Finance. India also 
requested to continue to pay Naval contributions ( £100 ,000) on the grounds that the 
Australian colonies and the Cape now contribute to their naval defence. ( 6) India was 
obliged to pay costs of maintaining the British Empire in areas wide of the Indian Ocean, 
including the Far East. 
As for the army costs, the Final Report recommended the following geographical 
principles for deploying Native Indian troops outside India. 
(1) India has not a direct and substantial interest in the deployment of forces in Europe; 
in Africa, west of the Cape of Good Hope; along the African coast south of Zanzibar; in 
Asia, East of China; in Japan or countries or islands east and south of China. 
(2) India has a direct and substantial interest in keeping open the Suez Canal, and in the 
maintenance of order and established government in Egypt. This interest might extend to 
the coasts of the Red Sea, but not to the Soudan, or further extensions of Egypt up the 
valley of the Nile or its affluents. India also has a direct and substantial interest in 
questions affecting Persia, and the coasts and islands of Arabia and of the Persian Gulf; in 
questions affecting Afghanistan and that part of Central Asia which is adjacent to the 
borders of India of Afghanistan; and in questions affecting Siam. 
(3) India may have a modified interest in questions affecting the East Coast of Africa as 
far as Zanzibar, and the African islands in the Indian Ocean, except Madagascar; in 
questions affecting China and the Malay peninsula. 
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(4) Special cases may arise giving to India a direct and substantial interest in questions 
connected with Europe or other territories in which the minute declares her to have, as a 
general rule, no interest.(?) 
(Refer to the attaching geographical map concerned with Native Indian troops.) 
According to the geographical distribution, the Government of India might have been 
required to bear a jJa:rt of the military expenses for native Indian troops, if the areas for its 
dispatch were within areas where India had a substantial or modified interest (as in (2) to 
(3) above). These principles are consistent with the preceding agreement which the 
Secretary of State for India had expressed in 1896 at the Suakin Expedition, (8) and except 
for the Soudan Expedition (1896-99), all Native Indian troop expeditions in the 19th 
century were affirmed. We must notice that the relationship between India and South 
Africa, especially regarding the interior zones, is vague and uncertain on one hand, and 
that India has a modified interest in questions affecting China on the other. 
Finally, the Final Report admitted the request for asking liberal treatment of the India 
Office based upon the following grounds: (1) India provides a large army to maintain 
British supremacy in the East. (2) A different organisation of forces is needed in the 
United Kingdom and India; there can, therefore, be no true partnership between them. 
The Commission recommended to the Imperial Government that the exceptional position 
of India as to military expenses should always be kept in view, and that grants of 
£293,000 should be made by the Imperial Government to the Government of India. (9) 
According to this report, the Home Government promised grants (liberal treatment) 
which were equal to only 1 per cent of the Home Charges, the equivalent of only 0.3 per 
cent of Indian Finance. We may say that the military costs and burden on India were 
scarcely mitigated by the Final Report of the Welby Commission. 
Against these recommendations, some members of the Commission expressed 
reservations. One member insisted that the maintenance of the military defence of India 
was one of the greatest Imperial questions and that the military fiscal burden imposed on 
India had no parallel elsewhere in the British Empire. (lO) A fierce criticism to the Final 
Report was expressed in Separate (minority) Report. (ll) This Separate Report complained 
that the Final Report only summarised the book-keeping and departmental mechanism and 
that it didn't sufficiently consider whether the public expenditure had been so controlled 
and guided as to promote in the most effectual way the general prosperity of the Indian 
people. It also requested a reconsideation of the Anglo-Indian financial relationship from 
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the Indian point of view, and reflected the opinion of famous Indian nationalist, moderate 
leader of the Indian National Congress, Dadabhai Naoroji. He insisted that there existed 
an abnormal economic condition in India and that the increased fiscal burden was imposed 
to meet not so much the growing needs of India as to increase the ever increasing drain of 
remittances to the U.K .. He put much emphasis upon the extreme poverty of the masses 
in India and the urgent necessity of a reduction in the general scale of Indian expenditure 
through the Indianization (more employment of the best and most intelligent of the 
Natives in higher levels of the service) of administration. (12) Regarding apportionment of 
military costs, he stressed that in the case of wars carried on in distant lands, such as 
Abyssinia, Soudan, Egypt, East Africa, or the Cape, no expenditure should be placed 
upon India, either ordinary or extraordinary. Mr .Naoroji took the endurance of the 
British Empire for granted and desired equal shares and burdens among the constituents of 
the Empire. His stance represents the early moderate nationalist opinions. 
2 The Anglo-Boer War and the Indian Army 
The Second Anglo-Boer War broke out in October 1899. Against the early optimistic 
expectation, it continued until May 1902, two and half years, and finally required the 
deployment of about 450,000 soldiers. I will reveal the position of the native Indian army 
within the framework of army mobilizations by using the Parliamentary Reports (WAR lN 
SOUTH AFRICA) of 1904. (13) 
From Table 2 it will be noticed that 18,534 officers and men (18,229 belonged to the 
Regular Army; 305 volunteers) were sent to South Africa during the war. Table 3 shows 
that the first Indian regiments (5, 903 men) were dispatched urgently just before the 
outbreak of the war. In fact the Secretary of State for War, Lord Lansdowne, had decided 
on the scheme for sending 10,000 men to reinforce and defend Natal on September 7, 
1899. (14) These battalions were fit for emergency service, and fulfilled the military role of 
India, "the British Barracks in the Oriental Seas." However, there remains one big 
problem, the composition of reinforcements from India. Table 3 only indicated the 
Regular Forces employed in South Africa during the whole war. In the case of India, it 
meant the Regular Home Army (the European Army) stationed in India, and native 
Indian soldiers were completely excluded from Tables 2 and 3. Weren't native Indian 
soldiers truly mobilized in South Africa during the war? 
Strictly speaking, native Indian personnel were dispatched to South Africa after all. 
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According to evidence presented by Major-General Sir Edwin H. Collen to the Royal 
Commission, the Government of India had sent 469 native soldiers as non-combatants and 
6, 602 native non-combz.tants (for a total of 7, 071) to South Africa at different times. (lS) 
The native personnel were sent as non-combatants to help in the remount depots, and to 
act as orderlies. In that number of native non-combatants, there were transport corps, 
water-carrier corps, corps of Syces and corps of native washermen. They went to South 
Africa with the Regular Home Army stationed in India. In this sense, only a few native 
Indian soldiers were sent to South Africa, but strangely this fact was not recorded in any 
of the Official British Papers. Why were native Indian troops not mobilized in large 
numbers during this critical British Imperial war? 
In order to reply to the above question, we must first recognise the attitude of the 
British Government to the Anglo-Boer War. The British Conservative Government had 
determined that the Anglo-Boer War should be a "White man's war," hostilities were to 
be only between two European races. The First Lord of the Treasury, Mr. A.]. Balfour, 
had declared that there was no intention of using any but white troops, <16) and again 
stressed that the war in South Africa was not to be carried on under ordinary conditions, 
and that by common consent, it was decided it should be confined to the two European 
races chiefly concerned. <17) This myth of a "White man's war" was strongly held by the 
Home Government and beca.rr.e a kind of unwritten rule. However, Dr. Peter Warwick 
threw strong doubt on this myth and revealed the large mobilization of native African 
peoples. According to his research, over 100,000 of them became directly involved in the 
struggle as scouts, spies, guards, servants and messengers, and in a wide range of other 
jobs with the white armies. At least 10,000 and possibly as many as 30,000 blacks were 
fighting with the British army as armed combatants by the end of the war. (IS) The British 
Government, however, didn't officially admit these facts. In January 1901 the commander 
in chief in South Africa, Lord Kitchener, contemplated the possibility of sending a 
number of Indian cavalry regiments to South Africa. However, St John Brodrick, the 
Secretary of State for War, believed that to send Indian soldiers to South Africa as 
combatants would appear as a confession of weakness, since the impression would be 
given that the army had no more white troops left. (19) 
In the early stages of the war, there appeared some public opinions favourable to 
sending native Indian troops to South Africa as combatants both in the U.K. and in India. 
For example, on November 30, and December 2, 1899 some letters were published 
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in THE TIMES which strongly advocated the dispatch of Indian troops. The tone 
of THE TIMES was positive for employing Indian troops in South Africa, making 
reference to the precedent set by Lord Disraeli's Malta expedition in 1878. (20) THE 
TIMES OF INDIA (an English paper published in Bombay) also published some letters 
which favoured the dispatch of native Indian troops or Indian volunteers. (21) Of course, 
some native Indian newspapers published in Bengal severely criticised the Anglo-Boer 
War as an imperialistic, unjust and aggressive war to the Boers. (22) Mr. Gandhi in South 
Africa, on the other hand, was very eager to serve the Imperial war, and he organized an 
Indian ambulance corps in Natal in order to perform the duties of honorable "British 
subjects" . (23) In spite of these favourable circumstances for mobilizing native Indian 
troops to South Africa, the Home Government adhered to the principle of a "White man's 
war" in South Africa. 
The second reply to the above question is concerned with the changing structure of the 
military system in the British Empire. The strength of British military forces at the 
moment of the outbreak ot the Anglo-Boer War is delimited in the following. <24) 
• the Regular Army········· Home .. ·············································· 125, 105 Men 
Colonies and Egypt······························ 51, 204 
India················································ 73, 157 
249,466 
• In addition to the Regular Army 
ArmyReserve···································· 90,000 Men 
Militia (including Militia Reserve)········· 129,572 
Yeomanry (including staff)·················· 11,891 
Volunteers······································· 264,833 
Channel Islands Militia························ 3, 996 
Malta and Bermuda Militia····················· 2, 732 
Total 752,490 Men 
Cf. Native Indian Troops···················································c. 140,000 
According to Lieutenant-General Sir William Nicholson, "out of a force of 750,000, of 
whom about 630,000 were normally stationed in the United Kingdom, only two Army 
Corps and a Cavalry Division-about 70,000 men in all-were organised and available for 
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dispatch across the seas for the reinforcement of any part of the Empire that might be 
attacked, or for offensive action" . (25) Therefore the first reinforcements were dispatched 
from India (the Regular Home Anny stationed in India) to meet the emergency in Natal. 
The British Home Government was confused by the hard fighting of the first phase of 
the war, and was forced hastily to dispatch reinforcements of 160,000 men from the U.K. 
by July 1900. In this sense, it was necessary, almost from the beginning of the campaign, 
to invite Militia Regiments to volunteer for foreign service, and to accept the assistance of 
Yeomanry, Volunteers, and Colonial forces. In fact, when the Queensland Colonial 
Government voluntarily proposed to offer 250 men to service in South Africa on 11 July 
1899, the Home Government welcomed the proposal. On 3 October 1899, :Mr. Joseph 
Chamberlain, the Secretary of State for Colonies, sent cablegrams to the Governors of 
Canada, New Zealand, and the several Australian Colonies in order to request Colonial 
forces. The Imperial Government would provide pay at Imperial rates, supplies, and 
ammunition; reimburse transport expenses for each Colony, pay disablement pensions, 
and compassionate allowances at Imperial rates. (26) In response to this request, the total 
number of 29,090 "Overseas" Colonials (Colonial Contingents) were engaged in campaigns 
in South Africa (7,368 Canadians, 16,632 Australians and 6,343 New Zealanders). In 
addition, a large body of men (from 50,000 to 60,000 men) was raised in South Africa 
itself. The total strength of the Overseas and South African Colonial Forces was about 
equal to the official estimate of Boer troops during the whole period of the war. According 
to the evidence to submitted to the Royal Commission, the Overseas Colonial Forces were 
of great value and provided good and useful service throughout the war, and their 
superior fighting spirit was highly admired. Their great achivements proved that such 
forces could be an important adjunct to the Regular Home Anny in any future war and 
that the Imperial Government could have "much confidence in the strength and 
unanimity of the loyalty of the Empire, and of the value of that loyalty if properly used 
within the limitations which circumstances impose " . (27) Under these expectations, it 
was not necessary to mobilize a large number of native Indian troops to South Africa as 
combatants. 
The existence of the Welby Commission and its Final Report seemed to prevent the 
deployment of a large number of native Indian troops to South Africa. When the 
Anglo-Boer War had broken out, the inquiries and discussions of the Commission were 
going on. Some Liberal M.P.'s expressed anxiety about dispatching the Regular Home 
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Army stationed in India to Natal as an emergency measure in October 1899. The lnlperial 
Government had to take a cautious attitude in sending native Indian troops to South 
Africa at the moment when the Final Report of the Welby Commission had just been 
submitted after five years of inquiries. (2B) Especially, as I have already mentioned before, 
under the clauses of the Final Report, the interior zones of South Africa had been left 
vague and uncertain for the dispatch of a native Indian army. There was also a loophole in 
the Final Report which was favourable to an arbitrary interpretation of the lnlperial 
Government. It might have been possible to shelve the Final Report. Therefore, I had 
better next consider the military deployments of native Indian troops outside India and the 
shift of international situations at the turn of the century. 
3 The Boxer Rebellion and the Indian Army 
The military deployments of Indian forces at the tum of the century were almost in line 
with the geographical recommendations of the Final Report of the Welby Commission. 
According to the statement of George Hamilton, the Secretary of State for India, in the 
House of Commons, the deployments of Indian troops in 1900 were as follows: (29) 
·One battalion of native Indian infantry (1,500 men) was sent to Mauritius. 
• 800 native Indian troops and 2,100 British troops (European Army) moved to Ceylon. 
• One battalion of native Indian infantry (800 men) was dispatched to Singapore. 
In exchange for these deployments, the Regular Home Army (European Army) stationed 
in each dependency (Formal Empire) was dispatched to South Africa. The principle of 
a "White men's war " in South Africa was reflected in these interchangeable army 
deployments. At the same time, 300 British troops and 3,376 native Indian troops were 
sent to British Somaliland (Formal Empire) in order to supress native turbulence. 
However, the overseas dispatch of native Indian troops on a large scale was carried out 
in China in response to the Boxer Rebellion in 1900. China was one of the areas of the 
British "Informal Empire " in the Far East, and since the Opium War, native Indian 
troops had been dispatched to China two times. Once was in case of the attack of 
Guangdong in 1856-57 (5, 787 Indian men) , and the other was during the occupation of 
Peking in the Second Opium War (11,000 men). In both cases the fiscal burden of the 
native Indian troops had been borne by the Home Government. <30) The news of Boxer's 
siege against the diplomatic corps in Peking came upon the Great Powers as a great shock, 
and they responded to this crisis by dispatching the combined rescue columns to Peking. 
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While the British Government was under pressure to reinforce the campaigns in South 
Africa, they first called on the Japanese Government to send a large force in July 1900 and 
then dispatched native Indian troops as an emergency measure. They also mobilized 
British Garrisons from Hong Kong and Weihaiwei. Almost half of the combined forces was 
Japanese and the number of British forces was about 3,000 men, mainly native Indian 
troops. An Indian unit was said to enter into the castle of Peking first. 
Finally, the troops sent from India to China to assist in putting down the Boxer 
Rebellion were 2,300 British troops (European Army) and 18,700 native Indian troops, 
totally 22,000 men. (3l) In addition two Australian colonies were sent 460 volunteers in 
response to the Imperial Government's request. Such military cooperation was highly 
appreciated as an upsurge of patriotic sentiments. Under the international pressures of 
critical public opinion, the British Imperial Government dared to send the largest scale of 
native Indian troops to China where the diplomatic and economic interests of the Great 
Powers were mingled with each other and the maintenance of the status quo was essential 
for British and Indian interests. Native Indian troops appeared again in Peking. 
The Indian nationalists levelled caustic criticism at the deployments of native Indian 
troops outside India at this critical stage. The chairman of the 1902 Indian National 
Congressional Session, Mr. Surendranath Banerjea and the Imperial Legislative Councilor 
of the Indian Government, Mr. Gopal Krishna GoKhale criticised the heavy military 
establishment and the excessive Indian military budget which made it possible to dispatch 
large Indian forces overseas. In response to such criticism, the British Imperial 
Government defrayed £2,930,000 from the Home Budget to save the Indian Government 
by reason of the deployment of native Indian troops in behalf of the British interests in 
China. <32) 
Conclusion 
I have already considered the deployments of native Indian troops at the turn of the 
century, and I may come to the following conclusions. 
First, the structural interrelation of the British Empire centering upon India was 
typically represented in the Final Report of the Welby Commission about the geographical 
principles of deploying native Indian troops outside India. Its report justified the wide 
military deployment of native Indian troops along the Empire Routes in Asia and Africa, 
from the Suez Canal in Egypt to China. The military role of the native Indian army as the 
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Empire's advance guard was strengthened at this turn of the century. At the same time, 
this military mobilization system was supplemented with military cooperation and 
additional voluntary forces from White Colonies (Canada, Australian colonies and New 
Zealand) . Colonial military cooperation and financial contribution to the Imperial 
Government gradually progressed from the late 1880s. Its effectiveness and the unity of the 
British Empire were first demonstrated by the Colonial overseas contingents of the 
Anglo-Boer War. This would lead to the comprehensive total war military-system of the 
First World War. 
Secondly, I referred to the British responses to the transformation of the modern 
world-system. In this paper I put much emphasis upon the mobilization of native Indian 
troops on the largest scale during the Boxer Rebellion in 1900. Britain had maintained a 
dominant commercial position in China since the mid-19th century. However, at the turn 
of the century, the German Empire, the United States (ascending "Core" Countries in 
the modern world-system) and Japan (an ascending "Semi-Peripheral " country) began 
to challenge the supremacy of Britain in the China market, and the scramble for Chinese 
territories was intensified. Although Britain needed urgent military reinforcements in 
South Africa in 1900, native Indian troops were urgently dispatched to China along the 
military precedents at this critical stage. We can interpret the presence of a large native 
Indian Army in China as "a sense of crisis " of the British Imperial Government, can't 
we? However, it might be more insightful to relate the British response to the Boxer 
Rebellion with the Anglo-Boer War. I have already noted that the British Government 
was reluctant to deploy native Indian troops in South Africa, and only a few were sent as 
non-combatants. Behind this reluctance of the British Imperial Government, there may 
exist the strong ideology of racism, or an adherence to the belief in superiority of the 
White race over Asian and African natives. Immanuel Wallerstein points out that this kind 
of racism was the peculiar ideology of Hegemonic Power in the modern world-system. (33) 
The myth of a "White man's war " in South Africa had to be kept forever if the British 
Imperial Government wished to retain its Hegemonic Power status in the modern 
world-system. In a sense, this politico-military dilemma of the descending Hegemonic 
Power, the U.K., prevented her from deploying a large number of native Indian troops in 
South Africa and this, in turn, prolonged the Anglo-Boer War. 
Later during the First World War, about 1,100,000 Indian people were sent overseas and 
130,000 native Indian troops were mobilized and forced to fight against white man's 
soldiers on the Western Front. <34l We can't find such a serious sense of crisis at the turn 
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of the century. However, the military deployments of native Indian troops seemed to 
reflect the dilemma of a descending Hegemonic Power, the British Empire, a dilemma 
which she had to face realistically within the changing modem world-system. 
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[Table 1] 
Return of Military Expeditions in which British, Colonial, or Native Troops have been 
Employed during the last Ten Years. 
Troops employed. 
Year. Expedition. Duration. Cost. Remarks. 
British. Colonial. Native. 
£ s. d. 
1895 Chitral 5,000 - 10,400 7months 1,222,600 0 0 
Inclusive of about 
1895-1896 Ash anti 1,000 - 1,000 2months 192,490 0 0 100,000 t defrayed 
from Army funds. 
1896 Matabeleland 660 2,143 5,129 9months 
6X These figures were 1896 Mashonaland 570 1,550 - 2,586,907 4 0 supplied by the British 
months South Africa Company. 
1897 Mashonaland 650 120 lOmonths 
1896-1899 Sudan 7,500 - 12,500 9month 2,415,000 0 0 
North-West 
1897-1898 Frontier of 15,000 - 37,000 8months 2,600,000 0 0 
India 
2years Approximate cost to 1899-1902 South Africa 365,693 82,742 - 187,725,700 0 0 31st March 1903. 
8months 
against Army Votes only. 
Inclusive of about 
1900 Ashanti - - 4,000 9months 428,000 0 0 50, 000 l . defrayed from 
Army funds. 
6.2_ Approximate cost to 1900-1901 China 23,000 - 18,700 3 5,827,800 0 0 
months 31st March 1903. 
(Source) British Parliamentary PaPers, 1903, Vol. 38, 108 (MilitaryExpeditions, 1895-1900). 
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[Table 2] 
The total number of officers and men of all Regular and Auxiliary Forces employed in the 
South African War. 
Officers, 
Non-commissioned Officers and Men. 
!exclusivE Infantry 
of 
Cavalry. Artillery. and 
Staff. Mounted 
nfantry. 
Garrison on 1st August, 1899- 318 1,127 1,035 6,428 
Regulars 9,206 22,348 18,426 156,288 
Militia 1,691 - 906 42,610 
Yeomanry 1,393 - - -
From Home 
Scottish Horse 15 - - -
Volunteers 589 - - -
S.African 
19 - - -
Constabulary 
Total from Home 12,913 - - -
regul.m 568 3,483 1,029 13,133 
From India 
Volunteers 16 - - -
Total from India 584 - - -
{ ColonhJ Contffig~t' 1,391 - - -
From Colonies S h Af . out ncan 
Constabulary( Canada) 29 - - -
Total from Colonies 1,420 - - -
* 
Raised in South Africa 2,324 - - -
Total 17,599 - - -
*These numbers are uncertain. 
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[Table 3] 
Regular Forces employed in South Africa during the whole War, with their composition 
and periods of arrival : -
Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers and Men. Total 
!exclusivE Infantry Officers 
of Cavalry. Artillery. and Others. Total. and 
Staff. Mounted Men. 
Infantry. 
I. Ganison on 1st August, 1899 318 1,127 1,035 6,428 1,032 9,622 9,940 
II. Reinforcements, 1st August, 
1899, to 11th October 1899 
(outbrealc of war)-
(l.)From Home 280 -
(2.)From India (some of these 
743 5,620 - 6,363 6,643 
did not reach South Africa 
until after the outbreak of 
hostilities) 259 1,564 653 3,427 - 5,644 5,903 
-
Total 539 1,564 1,396 9,047 12,007 12,546 
III. Further reinforcements from 
11th October, 1899, to end of 
July, 1900-
Regulars-
(1. )From Home and Colonies 5,748 11,003 14,145 110,292 14,347 i 1 ,787 155,535 
(2.)From India 132 713 376 670 1,759 1,891 
Total 5,880 11,716 14,521 110,962 14,347 151,546 157,426 
N. Further reinforcements from 1st 
August, 1900, to 30th April, 
1901-
Regulars-
From Home and Colonies 1,157 5,427 1,129 12,588 2,686 21,830 22,987 
1--· 
v. Further reinforcements from 1st 
May, 1901, to 31st December, 
1901-
Regulars-
Home and Colonies 1,244 3,871 1,115 2:~~ 2,230 21,502 22,746 India 108 1,206 - 3 3,749 3,857 
Total 1,352 5,077 1,115 16,826 2,233 25,251 26,603 
VI. Further reinforcements from 1st 
January, 1902, to 31st May, 
1902-
Regulars-
(l.)From Home and Colonies 777 2,047 1,294 13,502 2,640 19,483 20,260 
(2.) From India 69 - - 6,496 13 6,509 6,578 
Total 846 2,047 1,294 19,998 2,653 25,992 26,838 
GRAND TOTAL 10,092 26,958 20,490 175,849 22,957 246,248 256,340 
(Source) British Parliamentary PaPers, 1904, Vol.40, Cd. 1789, p.44. 
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